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In a paper by Kort (1987) it is shown that in deterministic
dynamic models of the firm the net present value of the last dollar
investment equals zero, if the firm is in equilibrium. We show that this
result not only holds in the case that the firm is a single decision maker,
but also if the firm is a player in a differential game. If we have a
differential game in which the government influences firms by announcing a
certain tax rate and the firms have to decide about whether to invest their
money or pay out dividend, then we can show that for the Nash- and
Stackelberg concept firms pay out dividend at the moment that the NPV
equals zero. We can also derive a net present value for the government (the
stream of (discounted) cash-flows (i.e. tax payments)) due to one extra
dollar investment by the firm). It turns out that in the open-loop
Stackelberg (in case of certain parameter values) case this NPV for the
government also equals zero at the moment the firms stop investing. This is
of great importance, because in this way we can derive decision rules for
governmental policy and we can calculate very easily the Stackelberg
solutions for more difficult models.
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1. Introduction:
For the outcome of the economic process and the way firms behave
governmental policy is of great importance. A crucial question in economic
theory is in this way: "how can the government by tax policy, wage
regulations or monetary measures influence the decisions of the firms in
such a way that the objectives of the national economy are achieved?" In a
previous paper [1] we have tried to model and describe interactions between
government and firm as a differential game in which different solution
concepts (Nash, Pareto and Stackelberg) are possible. Zn that modlel the
government has the possibility to influence the economic process by
announcing a certain tax rate, while the firms (represented by one) decide
whether to invest their money or to pay out dividend.
In this paper we give this model a better economic interpretation
by introducing the term net present value, which is wellknown from business
economics. Moreover, by using the net present value of marginal investment,
which we can calculate for both agents, we can derive decision rules for
firm behaviour and governmental policy and it turns out that these decision
rules can also be applied to more complex models.
In section 2 we give a brief presentation of the basic model and
its solutions for the different concepts. For a more detailed description
of this model we refer to [1]. Section 3 contains the calculations of the
net present value of marginal investment for the government and the firm.
Our interest is especially focused on the net present value at switching
times, i.e. the time-points at which an agent switches to another policy.
In section 4, we give a method for finding the Stackelberg solution for the
basic model based on the present values. In section 5 this method is used
to derive the Stackelberg solutions for the model with some extensions such
as a discount rate and a salvage value. Finally, in section 6 we make some
concluding remarks.
2. The model:
In this sectíon we introduce a simple model in which the
government maximizes its consumption and the firms (represented by one)
want to pay out dividend to their shareholders.2
2.1. The firm-
We assume that the firm behaves as if it maximizes the
shareholder's value of the firm. This value consists of the sum of the






in which t - time
T - planning horizon
D(t) - dividend
Assume that the amount oF capital goods can only be raised by investment:
K(t) - I(t), (2)
in which K(t) - capital good stock
I(t) - investment
We assume that profit is a linear function of the capital good stock:
0(t) - qK(t), (3)
in which 0(t): profit (before tax payment)
q: rentability of capital good stock
Assuming that profit after taxation could be used for investment or to pay
out dividend, we get the next relation:
0(t) - TX(t) - D(t) t I(t), (q)
in which TX(t) - tax payment
Furthermore, investment and dividend must be non-negative:
D(t) ~ 0
(5)
I(t) ~ o (6)
2.2. The government:
For the government too we make simplifying assumptions: all the
tax payments received will immediately be spent on government consumption
(,which is not productive). The government is not able to spend more than
it receives (i.e. no budgetary deficit):
TX(t) - G(t), (~)
in which G(t) - government consumption.




where U(G(t)) is the utility function for the government, which is defined
in terms of government consumption and ~r is the profit tax rate. In this
paper we assume:
U(G(t)) :- G(t), (9)
so the government has a linear utility function. Of course, other utility
functions are possible, but we have taken the linear one for simplicity. In





Furthermore we assume that the tax payments are restricted by:
~lo(t) ~ Tx(t) ~ ~2o(t). (11)
where T1 and t2 are constants such that:
0 ( tl~ t2~ 1
2-3. The total model:









u f qK(1-ul)(1-u2)dt , 0~ u2 ~ 1 (14)
2 0 -
-state equation
K - qK(1-ul)u2, (15)
where u1:-tax rate- p and u2:-investment rate- I
0-TX
In this way we have derived the same mathematical model as Lancaster [2)
but we use it to solve a completely different economic problem.
2.4. The solutions:
In (13)-(15) we have described the objectives, the dynamics and
the admissible strategies of the game. If we want to solve this game we
have to make some assumptions about the information structure (open-loop,4
feedback, closed-loop) and the solution concept (Nash, Stackelberg and
Pareto). As pointed out in [1] the open-loop Nash, the feedback Nash and
the feedback Stackelberg (with government as leader) are equal, so we can
concentrate on the open-loop solutions. The solutions are given in Table 1-
4. In the Stackelberg game is assumed that the government is the leader.
Table 1: The Nash-solution if ~2 ~ 2
----------------------------------------------------
I t E[O,t) I t E[t,T]
----------------------------------------------------
ul(t) I ~1 I T2
uZ(t) ~ 1 ~ 0
K(t) q(1-il)t
I K~e I Kw
------------------------------------------------------------
Table 2: The Stackelberg- and Nash-solution if
i2 ( 2
---------------------------------------------------------------------
I t E[O,t) I t E[t,t) I t E[t,T]
--------------------------------------------------------------------
ul(t) I T1 I t2 I T2
u2(t) ~ 1 ~ 1 ~ 0
q(1-il)t . q(i-iZ)(t-t) .. K(t) ~ K~e ~K(t)e ~ K
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 3: The Stackelberg-solution if T2 ~ Z
---------------------------------------------------------------------
~ t E L~,t) ~ t E[t,t) ~ t E[t,T]
--------------------------------------------------------------------
ul(t) ~ ~1 I tl I t2
u2(t) ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ 0
q(1-T1)t xww K(t) I KOe IK I KwNw
---------------------------------------------------------------------5
Table 4: The Pareto-solution
----------------------------------------------------
~ t e[~.tN) ~ t E[tN,T]
----------------------------------------------------
Ui ( t) ~ T1 ~ T g [T1 ..t2]
u2(t) ~ 1 ~ 0
~i(i-T )t NNMN
K(t) ~ K~e i ~ K
-------------------------------









t - min{T,T - )}
q(22-~1



















For the Pareto solution we assume that both players are in the same
bargaining position (see [5]). From the Tables 1 through 4 we conclude that
the problem has a bang-bang structure (i.e. the control jumps from its
lower- to its upperbound) (or from its upper- to its lowerbound)). This is,
because both Hamiltonians are linear in the control variables. The switch
from investment to dividend will take place, if u2 jumps from 1 to 0 and
the tax switch will take place, if ui jumps From Ti to T2. In each solution
the firm begins with investing all its money and the government asks the
low rate. At a certain moment the firm stops investming and starts paying
out dividend. In the case that z2) Z, the most interesting case, it is easy6
to see that the period of investment is different for the 3 solution
~ ~
concepts: t( t C t. In the Stackelberg case, as a compensation for the
fact that the firm goes longer on with investment, the government will
postpone the application of the high rate. So, in the Stackelberg case
there is a period possible in which the firm pays out dividend and the
government asks the low rate, while such a period could not exist in the
Nash game.
3. The net present value for the Qovernment and for the firm:
3.1. Introduction:
What is meant by the present value of an investment proposal ? Every book
on finance theory gives a definition. So we can find in [3, p. 26]: "an
investment proposal's net present value is derived by discounting the net
cash receipts at a rate which reflects the value of the alternative use of
the funds, summing them over the life of a proposal minus the initial
investment outlay". In our framework we can define the marginal net present
value for the firm as follows: the stream of dividend ( the cash receipts
for the shareholders) over the remaining part of the planning period due to
one dollar extra investment minus the initial investment outlay, which
equals one. In the basic model we have assumed that the discount rate is
zero, so we can take the (undiscounted) values of dividend. In section 5.2
we shall relax this assumption. In the same way we can define the marginal
net present value for the governmment: the stream of tax earnings ( the cash
receipts for the government) over the remaining part of the planning period
due to one dollar extra investment by the firm minus one. In subsection 3.2
we will derive these net present values at the switching points form
investment to dividend and from low to high tax rate. In subsection 3.3 we
shall derive this net present value for some examples at every time-point
for different tax regimes.
3.2. The present values at switchin;q times-
In Table 5 the net present values at the switching points for the


























Pareto ~ -t ~ T I-T I T
-------------------------------------------------------------------
(for a derivation see appendix 1)
The firm switches from investment to dividend at the moment that its net
present value equals zero. Only in the Pareto case the firm still continues
investing, because we have a cooperative solution and the sum of both
present values must be equal to one. This is optimal for the firm because
in the period before the net present value equals zero, it is greater than
zero, which implies that marginal earnings are greater than marginal costs.
After the switching time the net present value is less than zero, which
means that the firm makes a loss if it goes on with investing.
We will now discuss the situation T2~ 2. In the Nash case the net
present value for the government is still greater than zero, at the moment
that the firm stops investment. The government wants more investment, but
it cannot force the firm to do so. In the Stackelberg case the government
can force the firm to postpone the switch from investment to dividend by
announcing a longer period of low tax rate at the beginning of the planning
period. Therefore, playing Stackelberg is better for the leader than
playing Nash. For the follower too, Stackelberg is better than Nash. The
government fixes its switching point from low to high rate, so that at the
moment the firm switches from investment to dividend, the net present value
of the government equals zero. Now, the government also has reached an




whole planning period is not enough to have a net present value for the
government of zero at the switching time. So, the optimal policy is to
maintain the low rate during the whole period in order to tempt the firm to
invest during a long period.
When T2(Z, Nash is equal to Stackelberg. Now, the government
switches earlier than the firm due to the fact that its net present value
sooner equals zero. This implies that the net present value for the
government will not have a value of zero at the switching time from
investment to dividend, even not if the government postpones the
application of high rate, so there is no incentive to do so. At the
switching time of the firm the net present value of the government is less
than zero, so the government cannot reach an optimal situation with respect
to investment.
3.3. A Qraphical illustration:
It is also possible to calculate this net present value for
marginal investment at every time-point and not only at the switching
times. In Figures 1-6 we present a graphical illustration of the net
present value, in which we used the following parametervalues:
T1-4, 22-~
(Figures 1-2), t1-~, t2-~ (Figures 3-4), t1-b, tZ-b (Figures 5-6),q-K~-1
and T-5. For each set of parametervalues we have compared the net present
values for the following four possibilities:
i) the government and the firm play Nash
i) the government (the leader) and the firm play Stackelberg
iii) the government asks the high rate during the whole planning period
iv) the government asks the low rate during the whole planning period.
Table 6 gives the moment at which the tax and investment siwtch will take
place.9
Table 6 :the switching times
I T1-4 ~2-~ I T1-~ T2-~ I~1-b 22-È
-------------I-------------------I- ------------------I- -------------------






I 1 I 1 I 1
I 3 I ~ I ~ 3
- ~ I I; I I
I I ; I I s I I
--..... .. ....... I- --~- --...- -~-....- --...
comment IStackelberg-only -[ll Nash-Stackelberg I
------------------------------------------------------------------------
With our three sets of parameter values we have three illustrative exampies
of the possible solutions (see Tables 1,2 and 3).
In the first situation, where T1-~ and z2-4, it is easy to see
that the government will be better off, when Stackelberg is played, because
the NPV at the initial time is greater. The Stackelberg's NPV is also
greater than the NPV's of 'only i2' and 'only T1'. In fact the government
tries to choose a tax switch such that its net present value at the initial
time is as big as possible. The NPV of Nash is the greatest possible
outcome under the condition that the situation with low tax and no
investment cannot appear.
In the second situation, where t1-~ and T2-~, it ís optimal for
the government to stick to its low tax level. Each situation with only a
little interval t2 will give a lower NPV at the initial time.
In the third situation, where T1-b and i2-b, we see that the NPV
of the tax policy 'only T1' is smaller at every time-point than the NPV of
Nash. At a certain time-point t, before the firm switches from investment
to dividend, it is no longer optimal for the government to ask the lowFIGURE 1: THE NET PRESENT VAL,UES FOR THE GOVERNMENT
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rate. So there is no reason for a time-interval with low tax rate and no
investment and there is no difference between Stackelberg and Nash.
4. A method to derive the Stackelberg solutions:
In this section we give a solution method for finding the open-
loop Stackelberg solutions for the model specified in (13)-(15). In the
previous section we have argued that in the case ti(2 and 22)2 the net
present value at the investment switch for both particípants is zero. IF
the investment switch take places at t(u2(t)-1,te[O,t);u2(t)-0,te[t,T])
and the tax switch take place at t(ul(t)-Tl,te[O,t);ul(t)-TZ,tE[t,T]), we
can derive, taking into account that t~ t:
NPVf(t)-0 --~ NPVf(t) - J ~(t)(1-T(t))dt - 1
t
t T




NPVg(t)-0 -~ (t-t)qtl.(T-t)qt2-1 (26)
From (25) and (26) can be calculated t and t, because there are 2
equations, which are independent (if tl~zZ), and 2 unknown variables. With
t and t we can derive the control variables and the solution of the model.
If il)2 then it turns out that t) T, so there will be no tax switch. If
jz)2 then t ~ t and for these parameter values the Stackelberg solution is
equal to the Nash solution.17
Summarizing we can give the following method for finding the open-
loop Stackelberg solution for the basic model:
1) Find the Nash solution and calculate the parameter values, when
NPVg(t)(0. For these values Nash-Stackelberg.
(comment: also the Nash solution can easily be found with this NPV-method:
NPVf(t)-0 -~ t, if NPVg(t) ~ 0 then t - tax switch - t
if NPVg(t) C 0 then NPVg(t)-0 ~ t)
2) Find the solution of the two equations NPVf(t)-0
NPVg(t)-0 ~ t and t.
3) In the situation that t)T there will be no tax switch and the government
asks the low rate during the whole period.
From an economic point of view we can argue that this method can also be
used for the extensions, we take into consideration.
In appendix 3 we have given a scheme of the solution procedure.
5. Some extensions and their Stackelberg solutions:
Of course the model we have presented in section 2 is simple and has some
unrealistic features. In a previous paper [1, section 5] we have
generalized this model in several ways by incorporating a discount rate,
investment grants, depreciation etc.. In that paper we give the Nash
solution for these extendend models. In this paper we give the open-laop
Stackelberg solutions for two important extensions. To find the solutions
for more extensions ( and combinations) is a topic of future research.
5.1. the model with a salvage value:
If we incorporate a salvage value for the gove-rnment and the firm the model
becomes, ( OCa,bCl):
T
G: m~t) J qK(t)ul(t)dt ~ aK(T) , T1 C ul( i2. (27)
1 0
T
F: u~t) ó qK(t)(1-ul(t))(1-u2(t))dt . bK(T) , 0 C u2 c 1 (28)18
K - 9K(t)(1-ul(t))u2(t)
(29)
and the solution has the following form:
Table ~: The Stackelberg solution if T~ 1-a
2 2-a-b
---------------------------------------------------------------------
I t E Co.tl) I t E Ctl.tl) ~ t e Ct1,T]
--------------------------------------------------------------------
ul(t) ~ T1 ~ T2 ~ i2
u2(t) ~ 1 ~ 1 ~ 0
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 8: The Stackelberg solution if i~ 1-a
2 - 2-a-b
---------------------------------------------------------------------
~ t E C~.tl) ~ t E Ctl.tl) ~ t e Ct1.T~
--------------------------------------------------------------------
ul(t) ~ il I T1 I TZ
u2(t) ~ 1 ~ 0 ~ 0
---------------------------------------------------------------------






t1- min{T,T - }
q(T2-~1)
t- min{T - 2-a-b T- 1-b }
1 q q(i-~1)





The switches will be at a later time-point than in the basic model.
5.2. The model with a discount rate-
An interesting case is when we incorporate a discount rate. Let us assume
that the government and the firm have the same discount rate. In that case
the model becomes:
T max. G: ul(t) f ~ qg(t)ul(t)e-itdt ~ il c ul( T2, (34)19
T
F: u~t) f qK(t)(1-ul(t))(1-u2(t))e-ltdt , 0~ u2 ~ 1 (35) 2 0 -
K - qK(t)(1-ul(t))u2(t) (36)
We assume that i(q(1-T2), otherwise the marginal return on dividend is
greater than the marginal return on investment, so the firm will never
invest. Now we have two possibilities again:
Table 9: The Stackelberg solution if i2~ 2
----------------------------------------------------------------
~ t E CO.t2) ~ t e[t2.tZ) ~ t e Ct2,T]
----------------------------------------- -c2 ------------------
ul(t) I T1 I TZ I
u2(t) ~ 1 ~ 1 ~ 0
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 10: The Stackelberg solution if
t2~ 2
---------------------------------------------------------------------
~ t E[O.t2) I t E[t2,tZ) ~ t e[t2.T]
-------------------------------------------Z---------------
ul(t) ~ T1 ~ tl ~ T
u2(t) ~ 1 ~ 0 ~ 0
---------------------------------------------------------------------
where t2- T~ iln{1- 1 }
q(1-T2) (37)
- 1
t2- t2' q(1-T )-iln{(1}q(iqT2)-i)~(q(1qT2)-i}1?T )} (38)
2 2 2 2
- 1-2T
t- min{T,T - 1{ln(1. 1 x1~)}
2 i q(2Z-T1) 9-2i (39)
t2- min{T 4 iln(1-2q), T t iln(1- 1 )} (1}0)
q(1-zl)
(for a derivation see appendix 2)
When i)0 the swítches will take place at a sooner time-point.20
6. Conclusions:
In a paper by Kort (1987) it is shown that in dynamic
deterministic optimal control models of the firm the following decision
rule holds: the firm invests at its maximum if the net present value of
marginal investment is greater than zero and if it is equal to zero the
firm stops investment. Now, marginal earnings are equal to marginal costs
which implies that the optimal situation is reached. The firm tries to
reach the point, where the net present value equals zero, as soon as
possible. But in our framework where the firm is faced with corporate tax
this time-point depends on the tax policy of the government.
If we have a differential game with a tax maximizing government as
one player and the firm as the other player, it turns out that in the Nash-
and Stackelberg case the firm stops investment at the moment that the net
present value equals zero. But the government, which gets its money only by
corporate tax, also wants investment until the moment that its net present
value equals zero. However, in most cases the government is not able to
announce a tax policy such that the switch will take place at the moment
that its net present value equals zero. Only in the open-loop Stackelberg
solution (Tl~2,i2)2), where the government is the leader and in a stonger
position, will this happen.
This is of great interest, because in this way we have given a
better economic interpretation of the results and we have derived decision
rules for governmental policy and firm behaviour. These decision rules can
be used to derive the open-loop Stackelberg solutions for more complex
models.
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Appendix 1. the derivation of Table 5:
1. Nash:
i)If T2) 2 then t- investment-~tax switch - T- 1
q(1-T2)




- J q(1-T2)dt - 1- q(1-z2)(T-t) - 1- 0 (A1.2)
t
2T -1
NPVg(t) - qt2(T-t) - 1- 1-~ ~ 0
2
ii)If Y2C Z then t - investment switch - T- 1
q(1-~2)
ln(2t2)
and t- tax switch - t}
q(1-T2)




t q(1-T2)(t-t) T q(1-t2)(t-t)
1 NPVf(t) - Jq(1-t2)e dt4Jq(1-T2)e dt - 1- 2~ (A1.6)
t t 2
t q(1-t )(t-t) T q(1-T )(t-t)
NPVg(t) - JqT2e 2 dt t Jqi2e 2 dt - 1- 0 (A1.7)
t t
We have this exponent because of reinvestment
2. Stackelberg:
i)Zf T2C 2 then see l.ii).22
ii)If 22~
2, 21~ 2 then t- investment switch - T- q (A1.8)
1-221
t - tax switch - T -
q(22-21)
NPVf(t) - q(1-21)(t-t) ~ 9(1-t2)(T-t) - 1- 0
NPVg(t) - q21(t-t) 4 q22(T-t) - 1- o
1-221
NPVf(t) - 9(1-22)(T-t) - 1 - (1-2 ) - 1 22-21 2
' ' 1-22
NPVg(t) - q22(T-t) - 1- 2 T122 - 1
2 1
iii)If 21~ 2 then t- investment switch - T- 1
q(1-21)
t - tax switch - T
NPVf(t) - q(1-21)(T-t) - 1 - 0
22 -1
NPVg(t) - q21(T-t) - 1' 1-2 ~ 0
1
3. Pareto.




NPVf(t ) - q(1-2)(T-t ) - 1 - -T
w ~
NPVg(t )- qt(T-t )- 1- 2- 1
Appendix 2. the derivation of the open-loop Stackelberg solutions
1. The model with salvage value.
-Step 1:
NPVf(i1) - 0--~ (T-tl)q(1-22) t b- 1 (A2.1)23
-~ t1- T - 1-b
q(1-z2) (A2.2)
NPVg(tl) -(T-tl)qT2 t a- 1- iT~2(1-b) t a- 1 (A2.3)
t
NPVg(tl) C 0--~
1-z (1-b) . a- 1 C 0-~ T2C 21àab
2
For these parameter values Nash is equal to Stackelberg
-Step 2:
(A2.4)
As argued in section 3.3 for t ~ 1-a t -
2- 2-s-b (-investment switch) ~ t (-tax
switch), so that
NPVf(tl) - 0~ (tl-tl)q(1-il) t(T-tl)qÍl-T2) t b- 1 (A2.5)
1 - - - -
NPVg(tl) - 0--~ (tl-tl)4i1 t(T-tl)qT2 t a- 1 (A2.6)
Zt is easy to derive from (A2.5) and (A2.6):
` 1-a-(2-a-b)T1
tl- T - q(T2-T1)





If (1-a) -( 2-a-b)T1 C 0 or T1 C 21áab then tl(calculated by A2.7) ) T
So t1- T and t1- T- 1-b
q(1-il)
2. The model with the discount rate:
-Step 1:
2 - T -i(t-t )
NPVf(t2)-0 -~ f q(1-T2)e 2 dt - 1- 0
t2
~ t2- T } iln{1- 1 }
q(1-t2)
2 - qT2 -i(T-t2) 2z2-1







NPVg(t2) C 0~ 1-2 - 1 C 0-~ ~c2~ 2
2
For these parameter values Nash is equal to Stackelberg
-Step 2:
(A2.14)
As argued in section 3, for T~ 1- - 3 2- 2 t(-investment switch) ) t(-tax
switch), so that
2 - t2 -i(t-t ) T -i(t-t )
NPVf(t2)-0 ~ f q(1-T1)e 2 dt ~ f q(1-i2)e 2 dt - 1- 0
2 - t2 -i(t-t ) T -i(t-t2)





q(1-T1) -i(t2-t2) q(1-t2) -i(t2-t2) -i(T-t2)
i {1 - e } t i {e - e } - 1 (A2.15)
qTl -i(t2-t2) qT2 -i(t2-t2) -i(T-t2)
i {1 - e } t i{e - e } - 1 (A2.16)
From (A2.15) and (A2.16) we can derive:
t2- T t iln(1 - 21)
q
- 1-2i1 iq
t2- T - i{ln(1tq(T -T )Xq - 2i)} 2 1
-Step 3:
If 1- 2t1( 0 or T1) 2 then t2(calculated by A2.17) ~ T.
(A2.17)
(A2.18)
So t2-T and t2- T t iln(1- 1 ) (A2.19) 9(1-T1)25
Appendix 3. A solution scheme:
Let t- investment switch in case of Nash
t- tax switch in case of Nash
t- investment switch in case of Stackelberg
t- tax switch in case of Stackelberg
~~::~RT
Calculate t form NPVf(t)-0
CO
)0




calculate t and t, tCt
from NPVf(t)-0 and NPVg(t)-0
yes
no
t-T and calculate t
from NPVf(t)-0
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